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Human Rights in the United States Courts:
The Role of Lawyers
Steven M. Schneebaum*
The efforts of lawyers who represent clients in courts of the United States
have transformed the role of the international law of human rights. General
statements of policy have become the kind of law dispensed by American
judges in American courtrooms.
On one level, because the Bill of Rights codifies a very large and progres-
sive view of human rights and because the Bill of Rights is part of the Consti-
tution, which is the highest law of the land, it could be argued that in any case
invoking the Bill of Rights, the law of human rights has always been treated
as the rule of decision in U.S. courts. This Article does not address that kind
of case. Rather, this Article considers cases that, for one reason or another,
are not adequately resolved by appeals to the U.S. Constitution: cases in
which the international law of human rights is expressly cited as providing the
rule of decision. If there were no such cases, then it would be reasonable to
ask whether human rights law is anything more than aspirational and horta-
tory, a statement of hope for an improved future for everyone. But situations
in which international human rights law is actually the rule of decision that
determines whether the plaintiff wins or the defendant wins place us on the
road toward raising international human rights to the level of domestic law,
which determines the actual legal rights of actual living people.
Until 1979, the question whether the treaties of the United States that
have human rights elements are self-executing always framed the direct
application of human rights law before U.S. courts. In the 1950s, the Supreme
Court of California in Sei Fujii v. State' found that the human rights provi-
sions of the United Nations Charter are not self-executing: They cannot be
relied upon as generating the law of decision of a case without domestic
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legislative implementation.2 The Sei Fujii court concluded that the legislature
neVer enacted such measures?
Human rights law will seldom be useful law in U.S. courts if its use is
dependent upon the vehicle of a self-executing treaty to importtreaty language
into the courtroom. It will generally not be law in U.S. courts because the
treaties to which the United States is a party that contain human rights ele-
ments either expressly or by implication are not self-executing. Moreover, the
Congress of the United States has been slow at bringing international human
rights norms, beyond those that are already parts of U.S. law by virtue of the
Constitution, into American law.
In 1979, the case ofFilartiga v. Pena-Irala4 presented the following fact
pattern: A young Paraguayan woman, whose brother had been tortured to
death by the police of Asunci6n, saw the man who had allegedly committed
the murder on the streets of New York City.' She went to see a lawyer and
asked whether there might be any recourse against him in the U.S. courts for
the murder of her brother."
Because it has never been seriously contested, one can assume that the
murder was politically motivated. Specifically, it was an attempt by the police
of Asunci6n to strike out at the father of the boy who was killed: Joel
Filartiga, a physician and artist who was also a leading opposition figure in
Paraguay in the days of the Stroessner regime, which did not countenance
very much opposition.
Dolly Filartiga found the Center for Constitutional Rights in New York
City, whose lawyers had long dreamed of the case that would test the contours
of a statute enacted in 1789. That statute, passed immediately after the
adoption of the Constitution, was Section nine of the First Judiciary Act, 7 the
very same statute that led to Marbury v. Madison,8 in which the Supreme
Court of the United States first asserted its right to find legislative enactments
unconstitutional.' Section nine, now codified as 28 U.S.C. § 1350, provides
2. See Sei Fujii v. State, 242 P.2d 617, 621 (Cal. 1952) (stating that future legislation
clearly was needed).
3. Id. at 622.
4. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
5. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878-79 (2d Cir. 1980). Although she did not
know it at the time, Pena-Irala was in the United States illegally.
6. See id. at 879 (stating that civil complaint was served on Pena-Irala).
7. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73 (1789) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350
(1994)).
8. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
9. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803) (finding that courts
resolve conflicts between Constitution and legislative acts).
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that "[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by
an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty
of the United States."' 0
Certainly the drafters of the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA)" did not
envisage lawsuits over torture of Paraguayans by Paraguayans in Paraguay.
Between 1789 and 1979, the statute was invoked successfully only twice:
first, in the 1790s, in a case that involved the slave trade, 2 and second, in
1960, in a child custody case from Maryland. 3 In the latter case, a parent had
kidnaped the child to whom the other parent had custody rights through the
use of a false passport. 4 The court held that it had jurisdiction over the
subject matter because this offense was the violation of international law that
the ATCA required.
In Filartiga, at first instance, Judge Eugene Nickerson felt that he had to
defer to the Second Circuit's decision in IITv. Vencap Ltd.,5 which required
that the plaintiff and the defendant had to be of different nationalities for inter-
national law to be implicated. 6 The IT court described § 1350 as a "legal
Lohengrin" because no one knows its true origins, and it held that the statute
did not confer federaljurisdiction absentan internationally recognized delict. 7
The terms of the ATCA are simple and straightforward. A tort suit is a
suit for a civil wrong, for an injury. An alien is a noncitizen. And so in the
case of Joel and Dolly Filartiga against Amerigo Pena-Irala, the police chief
from Asunci6n, the first two elements of jurisdiction under the ATCA were
met: The plaintiffs were aliens, and they were suing for the wrongful death
of their son and brother, a tort suit alleging a violation of personal rights. But
the third element required by the ATCA - that the tort must have been com-
mitted in violation of the law of nations, or of a treaty of the United States" -
was the element other plaintiffs had found problematic, and it was the chal-
lenge for the Filartiga plaintiffs and their counsel.
No treaty even arguably applied in Filartiga9 Therefore, the question
for the court was this: If, as the complaint alleged, the defendant actually did
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994) (originally enacted as Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat.
77 (1789)).
12. Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810, 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1,607).
13. Abdul-Rahman Omar Adra v. Clif, 195 F. Supp. 857, 863 (D. Md. 1961).
14. Id. at 861.
15. 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975).
16. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980).
17. IT v. Vencap Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975).
18. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
19. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880.
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torture to death a seventeen-year-old boy because of the political views of his
father, then notwithstanding the fact that both victim and perpetrator were
Paraguayan and that the place where the injury occurred was Paraguay, was
international law violated?"
The plaintiffs argued that international human rights law now contains
a legally-enshrined prohibition against certain kinds of abuse, including
torture, regardless of nationality.2 ' According to them, the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights, the International Covenant of Civil and Political
Rights, and various other instruments, which are of legal significance even if
they are not treaties within the meaning of Article VI of the United States
Constitution, articulated this position.' They contended that virtually every
legal system in the world today contains a prohibition against torture.'
Furthermore, the Statute of the International Court of Justice provides that
general principles recognized as law by civilized nations are a source of
international law.2'
Political developments in the late 1970s aided the Filartigas' arguments.
The President of the United States, Jimmy Carter, had recently proclaimed
before the General Assembly of the United Nations that the day was past
when nations could lawfully treat their own citizens in inhuman ways without
international consequences. Torture, President Carter suggested, violates
international law irrespective of the nationalities of those involved.
The three elements of ATCA jurisdiction, therefore, appeared to be
present, and it would have seemed to follow easily from that premise that the
court had the authority to try the case. However, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York, in Brooklyn, where Pena-Irala
was detained in an Immigration and Naturalization Service holding facility,
dismissed it nonetheless. The court reluctantly concluded that, according to
such binding precedent as 1IT, a violation of international law may be found
only when the actor and victim are of different nationalities.' Judge Nicker-
son held that his hands were tied: As a matter of law, no international law
implications arise from actions by one citizen of a nation against another
citizen of the same nation.26
The Filartigas appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit in New York City. In a landmark opinion, Judge Kaufman
20. Id. at 884-85.
21. Id. at 879.
22. Id.
23. See id. at 880 (stating that virtually all nations denounce torture).
24. Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 38(l)(c).
25. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980).
26. Id.
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held that the legal premise underlying the trial court's resolution of the case,
if it had ever been correct, was no longer applicable." International law in the
closing decades of the twentieth century, he wrote, does include a prohibition
against certain kinds of actions even when performed by nations against their
own citizens.28
Judge Kaufman's resolution of Filartiga determined not only that interna-
tional law forbids torture by states of their own citizens, but also that these
legal provisions are part of the law of the United States.29 This latter aspect of
the decision is frequently overlooked, but it is vital to practicing lawyers: It
provided the roadmap for the invocation of human rights norms in domestic
cases.
The sources of international law at which the Filartiga court looked
included conventions that at the time had been signed but not ratified by the
United States. The court cited these conventions as evidence of customary
international law, as well as of general principles recognized by civilized
nations. Under the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties," however, the
fact that the United States had signed the conventions has an additional
significance: A signatory is forbidden to act in a manner inconsistent with a
treaty's object and purpose, even if it is not bound to its incidents.3 The court
therefore was correct to look at covenants of which the country was not a
party, as well as international instruments and General Assembly resolutions,
including the Universal Declaration, both because they are relevant to the
general international obligations of the United States and because they may
constitute elements of customary international law.
The Second Circuit placed particular emphasis on general principles,
citing constitutions and basic laws that condemn torture.32 It located custom-
ary law just as the International Court of Justice would, by identifying state
practice and opiniojuris.33 Filartiga, therefore, does not shed modem light
on the old question of whether any of the international human rights instru-
ments are self-executing. Scholars continue to debate this issue, but judges
have largely left it alone.
According to the normal method of textual analysis, however, it would
appear that at least key provisions of the human rights treaties are self-execut-
27. See id. at 884 (stating that distinction between aliens and citizens is clearly incon-
sistent with current international law).
28. Id. at 884-85.
29. Id. at 885-87.
30. Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
31. Id. art. 18.
32. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881-83 (2d Cir. 1980).
33. Id. at 883-84; North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969
I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20).
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ing. Frequently, in giving its advice and consent to the President in the process
of treaty ratification, the Senate expresses the view that a particular treaty, or
a particular provision of a treaty, is not self-executing. However, there is no
reason to assign to that expression of opinion any particular legislative force.
The courts can disregard it without fear, because the views of one house of the
legislature do not make laws under the Constitution, and it is treaties, not
resolutions of the Senate, that are "the Supreme Law of the Land."34
The process of determining when treaties are self-executing is similar to
deciding when statutes provide a private right of action. The analysis con-
cerns the precision of the instrument's language, its identification of a target
"zone of protected interests," the extent to which implementing legislation is
necessary to make sense of the textual provisions, and so on." Even without
arguing that SeiFujii was wrongly decided, and it may not have been, because
Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter call expressly for legislative or other mea-
sures to give them content,36 one could defend the proposition that such
treaties as the Torture Convention are self-executing.
Finally, in Filartiga, it was not necessary as a matter of strict logic to
find treaties to be self-executing because the plaintiffs were not seeking to
invoke private rights allegedly created by treaties. The point was not that
Paraguay violated a treaty in the torture of Joelito Filartiga; it was that his
torture and murder by Amerigo Pena-Irala were nevertheless violations of the
law of nations. That is all that § 1350 requires, and it is all that Judge
Kaufnan ultimately held.
The federal courts of the United States are courts of special jurisdiction:
A jurisdictional basis under the Constitution must be present for any case to
be brought in federal court. The Constitution lists the kinds of cases that the
federal judiciary may hear;37 the state courts are competent otherwise. Gen-
erally, simple torts, contract breaches, divorces, and will contests do not
present federal cases. No jurisdictional hook allows these matters to be
brought in federal court.
The bases for bringing cases in federal, as opposed to state, court are very
few. Federal jurisdiction exists if the plaintiff and the defendant are citizens
of different states, or if one of them is an American and the other a foreigner,
and the amount in controversy exceeds a statutory ceiling, currently $75,000.
31
The other primary basis for bringing cases into federal court is that the com-
34. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
35. See United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP),
412 U.S. 669, 686 (1973).
36. See'U.N. CHARTER art. 55 (stating that United Nations will promote general human
rights and freedom); U.N. CHARTER art. 56 (stating that members pledge to take actions to
achieve goals of general human rights and freedom).
37. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
38. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1994).
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plaint raises a question of interpretation or application of federal law.39 If a
case does not come within one of those categories, it is extremely unlikely that
a federal court can hear it.
40
In Filartiga, the plaintiff and defendant were both foreigners,41 so diver-
sity jurisdiction was not present. Nor could it be said that the case "arose
under" the ATCA, which does not create causes of action, but merely channels
cases arising in tort into the federal courts.42 Therefore, Judge Kaufman
reasoned, even if the three prerequisites for § 1350 jurisdiction were present
in Filartiga, the court could still be powerless to hear it.43 For that reason, he
demonstrated in his famous decision that the case did present a federal ques-
tion, because it arose under international law, which is part of the law of the
United States."4
Through that logic, Judge Kaufrman not only established the basis for
federal jurisdiction in Filartiga, but also laid the groundwork for subsequent
developments in § 1350 jurisprudence. Judge Kaufman started from the
premise that international law, whether conventional or customary, has long
been recognized as part of U.S. law.45 Mr. Justice Gray, as long ago as 1900,
specifically so held in The Paquete Habana:46 International law is part of the
law of the United States, to be invoked whenever needed to decide a case, just
like any other provision of law.47
Filartiga was such a case: A case in which interpretation and application
of international law, and an understanding of what international law is, are
vital to the determination of whether the plaintiff wins or the defendant wins,
and even to the threshold question of whether the door of the courthouse is
open or closed. Judge Kaufman's conclusion that customary international law
is federal common law meant that deciding Filartiga did not create constitu-
tional problems because, although there was no diversity of citizenship, the
case did arise under federal law, and specifically, the international law of
human rights.48
39. Id. § 1331.
40. Other exceptional categories of federal jurisdiction under the Constitution include
cases involving admiralty, diplomatically protected persons, actions brought by or against the
United States, and cases between states.
41. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878-79 (2d Cir. 1980).
42. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994) (granting jurisdiction to federal courts).
43. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 887 (finding that Alien Tort Claims Act does not grant new
rights, but presents opportunity for adjudication).
44. Id. at 887-88.
45. Id at 887.
46. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
47. ThePaqueteHabana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
48. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 888-89 (2d Cir. 1980).
55 WASH. & LEE L. REV 737 (1998)
On remand in Filartiga, another development followed, which was as
dramatic as the Second Circuit's decision and was really quite inspiring.
While Judge Kaufman had held that there was federal jurisdiction to hear this
case, he did not decide the merits, as there had not yet been a trial.4 9 The case
was remanded to the Eastern District of New York for that purpose.5
By that time, Pena-Irala, who had ceased to contest his deportation, was
out of the country." According to reports, he went back to Paraguay and
immediately fled from there to Brazil: Paraguay did not want him either. No
defendant appeared in court, and a default judgment was taken. 2 The Magis-
trate Judge to whom that procedure was assigned required the plaintiffs to
present evidence in support of their claims. 3 They presented witnesses who
testified about what had happened and about the terrible impact of the boy's
murder on them. At the end of the trial, the Magistrate Judge issued an
opinion finding that there had been a wrongful death and that damages were
to be awarded, but he declined to award punitive damages, as international
law, he said, does not recognize that concept." He also reduced the plaintiffs'
claims for pain and suffering and other "moral damages" because he con-
cluded that the law of Paraguay, where the incident occurred, does not recog-
nize such awards.5 He reduced the $10 million judgment sought to approxi-
mately $500,000.
When a case is assigned to a Magistrate Judge for a preliminary decision,
either party is free to take an appeal to the District Judge. Accordingly, the
Filartigas appealed to Judge Nickerson. Judge Nickerson's decision on
remand56 is inspiring, both as prose and as legal scholarship. He determined
that the Magistrate Judge had erred in applying the law of Paraguay; the
proper law in this type of case is international law because the acts com-
plained of were wrongs under international law, and the rules of international
law must therefore be the rules of decision.57 To do otherwise, Judge
Nickerson wrote, would be to hold that international law is "a mere set of
benevolent yearnings never to be given effect."5" International law is law, he
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See id. at 880 (stating that Pena-Irala returned to Paraguay).
52. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860, 861 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
53. See id. (stating that question of damages was referred to magistrate judge).
54. Id. at 864.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 860.
57. Id. at 863.
58. Id.
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held, and as such it is to be applied to real cases. Judge Nickerson awarded
millions of dollars in damages, which obviously were never paid.59
The concept of a federal common law that is unwritten, which exists
alongside the enactments of Congress, even if it is limited in scope, is not
unfamiliar. One of its primary components is customary international law,
which is binding both on and in the United States. Therefore, even if a case
presented a human rights issue, but did not have an alien plaintiff or did not
sound in tort and therefore would not satisfy the jurisdictional prerequisites
of § 1350, federal jurisdiction could nevertheless be found under constitu-
tional principles that permit the federal courts to hear cases "arising under the
laws of the United States."
Since 1979, a number of other key decisions have begun to fill in the
outline and the contours of human rights law as law of decision. In the years
immediately following Filartiga, a large number of Cuban refugees reached
the shores of Florida. Following an off-hand remark by the United States
President to the effect that Cubans were always welcome here, Fidel Castro
expelled over 100,000 of his country's citizens. This gave Castro an opportu-
nity to discard those he considered to be the detritus of his civilization, mainly
inmates of mental hospitals or jails, and those whose political views were
troublesome to his regime.
When the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
processed these individuals after they came on shore, INS officials asked the
refugees a series of questions, one of which was whether they had ever
committed a crime. Most of the "Mariel boatlift" refugees - who were, after
all, in large part prisoners - knew that the proper answer to that question was
"no." Because Castro did not send prison records along with the "Marielitos,"
the INS could not verify the answers. But occasionally one would tell the
truth. A man by the name ofFernando Rodriguez-Femandez was one of them.
He confessed that he had committed two crimes in Cuba: He stole a suitcase
in a bus station, and he attempted a prison break after his conviction for the
theft.60
The INS considered these to be crimes of moral turpitude and on that
basis determined that Rodriguez-Fernandez was to be excluded from the
United States.6' Although he was detained, as irony would have it, in Fort
Leavenworth in Kansas, very near the geographical center of the country, as
an excluded alien, he was notionally not on United States soil at all.62
59. See id. at 867 (awarding total judgment of $10,385,364).
60. Rodriguez-Femandezv. Wilkinson, 654F.2d 1382, 1384(10th Cir. 1981), aff'g 505
F. Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980).
61. Rodriguez-Fernandez, 505F. Supp. at 789.
62. Id.
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After he was in Fort Leavenworth for a considerable while, with no
apparent prospect for his release, lawyersacting on his behalf petitioned for
a writ of habeas corpus to challenge his confinement. 3 They argued that he
had not been convicted of a crime, that he had not been afforded due process
(in fact, he had had no process at all except that which went into the determi-
nation of excludability), and that he had not received a trial in the United
States." The question presented to the court was whether the United States
was violating his human rights by detaining him, potentially indefinitely, in
a federal penitentiary."
All precedent, including decisions of the Supreme Court in Cold War
cases, said that an excluded alien had no rights whatsoever.6 The U.S. gov-
ernment, therefore, found itself defending the proposition that excluded aliens
were essentially not people: They had no legal rights and therefore no legal
remedies. The government was unable to respond to an absurd proposition
that seemed to follow from its argument: that it could do medical experimen-
tation on excluded aliens, or that it could torture them. The United States
contended that the precedents that restricted the rights of excluded aliens were
binding on the United States District Court for the District of Kansas, before
whom the Rodriguez-Fernandez case came. 7 On appeal to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Denver, sitting in the very same
court building in which the Timothy McVeigh trial was to take place years
later, the government reiterated the argument that the court's hands were tied
under the system of stare decisis that rules in this country." Courts, it said,
have to obey the law as laid down by higher courts, meaning that the Tenth
Circuit was bound to conclude that this man, an excluded alien, was without
rights that could be enforced against the government.
A very wise judge in Kansas, who had probably never encountered an
international law case before in his career, said that the government's position
was clearly inconsistent with the character of the United States.69 It was
impossible to conclude, he held, that a human being, physically present within
the borders of the United States, is literally without legal rights.7 ° He said that
any logic that leads to such an impossible conclusion must have a flawed
63. Id. at 788.
64. Id. at 790.
65. Id.
66. See, e.g., Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) (finding that excluded
alien is entitled only to process that Congress affords).
67. Rodriguez-Femandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 794 (D. Kan. 1980).
68. See Rodriguez-Fernandezv. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382,1388 (10th Cir. 1981) (stating
that linchpin of government case was Supreme Court opinion).
69. Rodriguez-Fernandez, 505 F. Supp. at 795, 799.
70. Id. at 799.
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premise, and therefore, that the premises should be reexamined.7" Every
human being has a core of human rights just by virtue of being human.72
There could be no derogation from thejus cogens norms that protect those
rights.
To the extent that a right by definition entails a remedy and that they are
the obverse and the reverse of the same definitional coin, the Rodriguez-
Fernandez holding meant that even excluded aliens may come before a United
States federal court to complain that they have certain rights and that the
United States government is violating those rights. The Reagan Administra-
tion's Department of Justice did not want such a blunt decision to go in the
books, under which a federal court would actually order the freeing of a
detained alien under these circumstances. The Tenth Circuit issued a very
well-written, powerful decision, but the courts stopped short of actually
ordering that Rodriguez-Femandez be released. Ninety days later, the Justice
Department "voluntarily" released him.7'
The days following the case that came to be reported under the name
Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson were very heady days for human rights
lawyers. It looked as if a whole revolution had occurred between Filartiga
andRodriguez-Fernandez. Within two years, United Statesjudges had woken
up, the scales had fallen from their eyes, and suddenly they were aware of a
new source of law and a new source of protection for individuals in the
international law of human rights.
Legal systems, however, do not change like that: They evolve much
more glacially, and this area was to be no exception. Throughout the 1980s,
some of the more optimistic claims for human rights law underwent a gradual
erosion. Events in Central America, and especially the activities of the
United States in Nicaragua, caused human rights activists to assume extreme
positions in attempting to concoct international human rights theories that
would, they thought, enable judges to overturn aspects of U.S. foreign policy
as unconstitutional or illegal. In one case, plaintiffs' counsel told a federal
judge that U.S. policy in Nicaragua was inconsistent with binding norms of
international law that forbid war.74 Advocates in the human rights movement
actually appeared to believe that an American judge, wearing a black robe, in
a courtroom at 3rd Street and Constitution Avenue in Washington, or in the
federal building in Hammond, Indiana, or Cedar Rapids, Iowa, would pick up
his or her gavel and pronounce the words, "Because the United Nations
71. Id. at 798.
72. Id. at 799.
73. Free at Last, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 10, 1981, at 1.
74. Sanchez-Espinozav. Reagan, 568 F. Supp. 596, 598 (D.D.C. 1983), aff'd, 770 F.2d
202 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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Charter forbids war, the plaintiff has adequately demonstrated to my satisfac-
tion that U.S. foreign policy of supporting the contras in Nicaragua is illegal,
and I hereby enjoin it. Call the next case!"
Such a result was and is inconceivable: It was never going to happen,
partly because human rights activists did not properly focus our youthful
exuberance and partly because the cases were just not powerful cases. One
case in particular stands out as marking a real problem for the emergence of
human rights law as the law of decision in domestic litigation: Tel-Oren v.
Libyan Arab Republic.75
The Tel-Oren plaintiffs were the surviving victims and the representa-
tives of those killed in the bombing of a bus in the north of Israel, allegedly
by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).76 They brought their action
under the ATCA, alleging that terrorism is a violation of the law of nations.'
The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia against the following four defendants: the PLO, the government of
Libya, the National Association of Arab Americans, and the Palestine Infor-
mation Office.78 The last two defendants are American lobbying organiza-
tions that have headquarters in Washington. They send out leaflets and go to
cocktail parties on the Hill and argue for their point of view on legislative and
executive policy. The government of Libya is, of course, a sovereign entity,
which, whether one likes it or not, has certain rights in the courts, including
the right of sovereign immunity. The PLO is without legal personality, at
least under the laws of the United States.
Tel-Oren was, therefore, a difficult case from the beginning, and it should
have been dismissed summarily simply because the only two defendants who
could actually be forced to appear before the court were, at best, remotely
connected with the substance of the case. Furthermore, the two defendants
who may have been responsible for what happened, the PLO and Libya, were
not before the court. The case could and should have been resolved on that
basis. But it was not.
Tel-Oren was dismissed in the district court on the grounds that the
norms of international law on which the plaintiffs relied are not "self-execut-
ing."79 Specifically, according to Judge Joyce Hens Green, unless the norm
of international law that forbids terrorism, assuming such a norm can be
demonstrated, also includes the agreement of nations that it can be enforced
75. 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
76. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774,775 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam),
affg 517 F. Supp. 542 (D.D.C. 1981).
77. Id.
78. Tel-Oren, 517 F. Supp. at 544.
79. Id.at549,551.
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through private actions in municipal courts, then the plaintiff has no legal
right to assert.8"
Judge Green's decision was plainly inconsistent with the Second Cir-
cuit's opinion in Filartiga. The principle that the international law of human
rights may not be used as the law of decision in a case unless the relevant
international norm itself provides for a private right of action - an explicit
provision that a norm can be enforced in the courts - entails logically that
international human rights law is not law at all. Not even the prohibition
against torture in Filartiga was found to contain a license for private rights of
action. Because it derives from custom and not text, there is nothing in the
norm condemning torture that has, after a hypothetical Article X, paragraph 1,
"Nations are forbidden to torture anyone including their own citizens," a
paragraph 2 that says, "This provision shall be enforceable in any domestic
court with personal jurisdiction over a torturer." Customary international law
simply does not develop or operate in that manner.
The decision of the United States Court of Appealslfor the D.C. Circuit
was per curiam, and three separate, passionate, and highly divergent opinions
of Judges Edwards, Bork, and Robb followed the decision." The divisions
among thejudges, as well as the complexities in the Tel-Oren facts, weakened
the case's authoritativeness. But Tel-Oren did demonstrate that human rights
activists could nottake a sound understanding of international law among U.S.
judges for granted. Promoting the international law of human rights as the
law of decision in U.S. courtrooms was going to require no small amount of
effort, including that ofeducatingthejudiciary. Some human rights advocates
attempted to take that stricture seriously. They have been somewhat success-
ful on two fronts: the judicial, and the legislative.
In the mid-1980s, at the strong urging of various non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), Congress passed the Torture Victims Protection Act
of 1991 (TVPA),8 - which locks the result in Filartiga into statutory law. The
TVPA provides that victims of torture in foreign countries may bring tort
cases against their abusers over whom the courts of the United States have
personal jurisdiction.83 It provides a statute of limitations, lays down proce-
dures for service of process, and resolves other technical issues that might
otherwise bar a potential torture victim plaintiff's cause of action." But it is
limited to state-sponsored or state-endorsed torture: It does not assist victims
80. Id. at 549.
81. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 775.
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of apartheid, disappearance, or female genital mutilation,85 whose human
rights abuse cases might someday come before the courts.
Some human rights lawyers, including this author, thought that the legis-
lative initiative to enact the TVPA was counterproductive and had absolutely
no chance of success. They thought that having Jesse Helms and others
denouncing it on the floor of the Senate not only would kill the bill, but would
be the death knell for the Filartiga holding itself. They imagined that the
speeches that Helms and others would give, condemning the interference of
foreigners in our American judiciary, would be cited in every domestic case
involving the international law of human rights forever. But they were wrong:
The bill passed. The President signed it. Progress was therefore made on the
legislative front.
At the same time, one of the lessons of Filartiga actually came to be
internalized by the judiciary. During the oral argument one of the judges
asked counsel representing the Filartigas the following question: Because the
defendant apparently does not have much money, what was the point of this
high-profile case, other than getting your name in the newspapers? Peter
Weiss answered that the point was to send a message that the United States
is not a haven for people like Pena-Irala. People who torture are not welcome
here, and if they come here, they will be pursued by their victims, who will
use the full arsenal of the United States judicial process to defend and to
vindicate their rights.86
Weiss's prediction turned out to be accurate. Ferdinand Marcos came to
the United States and was sued. 7 He and his estate had to go through a
full-blown trial in the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii,
in which witness after witness took the stand and testified about torture and
mistreatment at the hands of Ferdinand Marcos. A judgment was entered
against the Marcos estate and, this time, there is a real prospect not only that
they will have some kind of psychological closure, but that human rights
abuse victims-will be compensated by their tormentors with real dollars.88
The recent decision of the Second Circuit involving Radovan Karadzic89
also constitutes an important part of the good news. The plaintiffs were
85. Id.
86. At oral argument, a similarly troublesome question was asked of the defendant's
counsel: Why make such an issue out ofjurisdiction in the federal courthouse when no question
existed that jurisdiction over the defendant would have been proper in the state supreme court,
just across Foley Square in lower Manhattan? The court pointed out that, to assert jurisdiction
in state court, all the Filartigas needed was a live defendant who was properly served and a
proper allegation that the defendant had done something wrong.
87. In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Litigation, 978 F.2d 493, 495 (9th Cir. 1992).
88. Id. at 503 (affirming judgment).
89. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1005 (1996).
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people generally who claimed to have been subjected to ethnic cleansing in
Bosnia, and women who claimed to have been the victims specifically of
systematic rape and other sexual violence. 0 Both groups sued Karadzic
personally for the campaign of human rights violations of which he was the
architect.9 He was served with process in the lobby of the Hotel Inter-Conti-
nental on East 48th Street in New York City.'
The plaintiffs brought suit against Karadzic in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York in Manhattan under the ATCA
and also the TVPA 3 The plaintiffs made the same arguments that the plain-
tiffs made in Filartiga: They were aliens, their case was one in tort, and the
actions that injured them constituted violations of international law.94
At the threshold, it was necessary to determine whether or not Karadzic
was properly served.95 Apparently, the process server attempted to hand
Karadzic the papers, but they fell at his feet after his security guards inter-
vened.96 He claimed not only that the service was ineffective, but also that he
was entitled to diplomatic immunity, not least because he was in New York
in connection with official business at the United Nations.97 In any event, it
was resolved that the service was effective.98
Karadzic did not attempt to argue that the horrible events alleged in the
complaint had not happened. Presented by Ramsey Clark, a former Attorney
General of the United States and the son of a Supreme Court justice, Karad-
zic's argument was much cleverer than that. Karadzic contended that he is not
bound by international law." International law, he argued, is not simply a set
of abstract normative propositions. In order to understand what international
law is, one has to know to whom it is addressed. Torture, after all, is an
internationally cognizable wrong only by virtue of who is doing it. Purely
private acts do not fall within the scope of international law."° So, if one
should have the misfortune to be gunned down on the streets of Washington,
or to be blown up in a federal office building in Oklahoma City, however
90. Id. at 23 6-3 7.
91. Id. at237.
92. Id. at 246.
93. Doe v. Karadzic, 866 F. Supp. 734, 738 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
94. Id. at 739.
95. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1005
(1996).
96. Id. at 246.
97. Id. at 247.
98. Id.
99. Doe v. Karadzic, 866 F. Supp. 734, 740-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
100. See id. (stating that only state actors come within purview of § 1350).
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dreadful that might be, no violation of international law has occurred. Torture
is different from mere thuggery, which may be criminal by all means, but it
is criminal only under municipal law.
Karadzic's argument was an interesting position for an individual who
considered himself to be the head of state of the so-called Republika Srpska,
the Bosnian Serb entity. An obvious inconsistency exists between Karadzic's
contention that service on him was improper because he was a diplomati-
cally-protected person attending a meeting of the United Nations in his
official capacity and the argument that he is not a subject of international law,
but rather a private actor.
Nevertheless, Judge Peter Leisure of the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York agreed with Karadzic's position, and he
held that to be bound by international law, one must have international legal
personality.101 For an individual, international legal personality depends upon
the actual or at least apparent authority to act on behalf of, in connection with,
or under the umbrella of a state. Concluding that Karadzic's Republika
Srpska is not a state, inter alia, because it is not widely recognized, Judge
Leisure held that the acts were simply those of a gang of outlaws, just like a
gang on the streets of Washington or Los Angeles or in the hills of Burma. 2
What happened to these plaintiffs may have been terrible and appalling, said
Judge Leisure, and the acts themselves may have violated every norm of
civilized conduct known, but there are no logically compelled international
legal implications of even outrageous misconduct unless it was committed by
or on behalf of an international legal person. 3
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed,
holding that the plaintiffs had adequately pleaded a cause of action against
Radovan Karadzic.'O The Second Circuit held that there is no presumption
that international law imposes obligations only on states and not on individu-
als, much less on groups organized under arms for the purpose of taking
political power.'05 Situations in which international law bound individuals
have always existed - piracy, abduction of ambassadors, and the trade in
101. See id. at 741 (finding that § 1350 does not redress acts of torture engaged in by
private individuals).
102. See id. (finding that Karadzic's faction did not act under color of any state law).
103. Id. at 740-41.
104. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 247 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1005
(1996). The case in New York is civil in nature, and therefore it has no preclusive effect con-
cerning the possibility of a subsequent criminal prosecution of Karadzic before the Tribunal in
The Hague.
105. See id. at 239 (holding that certain conduct violates international law whether under-
taken by state or private actors).
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slaves- are all international offenses that only individuals can commit.'0 6 The
addition to this list of new internationally-cognizable offenses that can be
committed only by individuals in the late twentieth century is merely building
on what has always been the law. Human rights abuses ofat least certain types,
when committed by individuals in circumstances that otherwise give rise to
international implications - not on the streets of Detroit, for example, but on
the streets of Sarajevo, where there are foreign armies and where international
politics is being waged - are sufficient to create violations of international
dimension out of what would otherwise be acts of simple criminality.
The Supreme Court of the United States declined to review the decision,
and it therefore stands as law, albeit only of the Second Circuit (New York,
Vermont, and Connecticut)."°7 The Second Circuit, however, is avery author-
itative one, and it is the Second Circuit, after all, that began this trend toward
the use of human rights norms as the law of decision in U.S. courtrooms in
Filartiga. There is reason to hope, therefore, that Doe v. Karadzic is the wave
of the future.
Positive developments have emerged even since the Karadzic decision.
International human rights scholars have begun to turn their attention to a
potentially fruitful area, both to remedy and to deter violations: attempting to
hold private American corporations thatjoint-venture with repressive regimes
liable for the foreseeable human consequences of their activities. In a current
case in California, for example, a group of Burmese victims of human rights
abuses has filed suit under the ATCA and the TVPA against UNOCAL, which
apparently has a joint venture with the governing junta in Burma, almost
universally condemned for its illegality and brutality, to construct a natural
gas pipeline.'0° The plaintiffs claim to represent various classes of people
who they allege were abused in connection with carrying out the joint ven-
ture's objectives: people who were forced into slavery or porterage, who were
uprooted from their homes, whose villages were destroyed, and who were
raped and killed.0 9
Sovereign immunity almost certainly prevents a suit against the govern-
ment of Burma in such a case. A government has not been the defendant in
any of the successful human rights cases. Under current law, sovereign
immunity means that governments are simply not amenable to the jurisdiction
of the courts unless certain enumerated exceptions apply."0 The degree to
106. Id.
107. See Karadzic v. Kadic, 518 U.S. 1005, 1005 (1996) (denying certiorari).
108. Doe v. UNOCAL Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 883-84 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
109. Id. at 883.
110. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1994); Argentine Republic v. Amerada-Hess Shipping, 488 U.S.
428,439 (1989) (findingthatimmunity appliesunless case comeswithin enumerated exception).
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which conduct was reprehensible, however, is not sufficient to create an
exception.
There may be nojudicial remedy against the Burmese governing junta for
whatever might have happened on that pipeline, however, a remedy against
the junta's American business partner could be possible. The common law
decrees that if one participant in a joint pursuit commits a tort in the course
of pursuing the shared objective, both are liable because they were engaged
in a common venture. The argument in UNOCAL is that an immune defendant
and a nonimmune defendant conspired together, and the nonimmune defen-
dant can be sued and is liable. The federal trial court in California denied
UNOCAL's motion to dismiss,' and this case is proceeding.
UNOCAL's lawyers will have some serious problems. Even if they are
confident that they can file powerful motions to dismiss and for summary
judgment, they are still going to have to take depositions, to produce docu-
mentary evidence, and to show all of their books and records in connection
with the building of the pipeline. Moreover, a resolution to the effect that a
private actor can be held jointly responsible with a government that abuses
human rights is, in any event, a major development of human rights law.
Yet, for all the good news about the use of human rights law in American
courtrooms, there is still no progress in bringing the techniques and the
content of international law to bear on the most egregious human rights viola-
tions committed by the United States itself on a systematic basis. Challenges
founded in the emerging respect for the international law of human rights have
not been successful.
In the least defensible systematic abuse of human rights in the United
States -the use of the death penalty - absolutely no inroads from international
human rights law have permitted. Several years ago, the Supreme Court, in
one of the last times it removed an entire class of people from death row, held
that it was unconstitutional to execute someone who was under the age of
sixteen at the time of commission of the crime. The Court struck down an
Oklahoma law that permitted the execution of juveniles,' but in so doing
went out of its way to ignore all the friends of the Court who had argued that
international law provides an independent but compelling basis to forbid that
kind of state action. The Supreme Court held that the execution of juveniles
was inconsistent only with U.S. domestic constitutional law making not even
a passing reference to the international authorities. The Supreme Court
111. UNOCAL Corp., 963 F. Supp. at 897.
112. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988) (finding that imposition of
death penalty for acts committed by person under age 16 violates Eighth Amendment of
Constitution). But see Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (finding that imposition
of death penalty on persons age 16 or above did not violate Constitution).
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foreclosed any hope that the Court would ever expand the prohibition beyond
that sixteen-year-old age limit."'
Another area in which international human rights law was dramatically
held not to have any relevance to evaluation of conduct of the United States
involved the kidnaping (the government prefers the locution "irregular rendi-
tion") of a fugitive from Mexico: UnitedStates v. Alvarez-Machain.,4 In that
case, representatives of the United States Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) entered the territory of Mexico, a country with which we have an
extradition treaty, captured someone suspected of killing a DEA agent and
abducted him into the United States, where he was brought before the United
States District Court for the Central District of California to stand trial. 1 5 He
challenged the ability of the court to try him on the grounds that his appear-
ance was obtained illegally, but he failed." 6 The court held that it did not
matter why or how he came to be there, and it rejected the claim that his
presence was procured only by way of a violation of international law and that
therefore the trial could not lawfully proceed.' 7
In the Supreme Court of the United States, six out of ninejustices agreed
with the district court. They found that although the U.S.-Mexico Extradition
Treaty (the Treaty) provides procedures for extraditing suspected criminals,
nothing in the Treaty says that those procedures are exclusive."' The United
States, reasoned the Court, retains the power to do whatever is not expressly
forbidden, and the victim of this international abduction has absolutely no
right to insist that the Treaty's provisions be honored." 9 The irony in this
case is that when Alvarez-Machain was finally tried, he was acquitted. The
precedent, however, endures as another example of a double standard in the
use of human rights law in the courts, with the United States not held account-
able under the same rules applicable to other nations.
Considerable improvement over the last twenty years in the use of
international human rights law in the courts of the United States has occurred.
Judges increasingly take notice of international law arguments in broader
113. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 838. Most recently, the Supreme Court of the United States
and the governor of Virginia both denied the relevance of international law to death penalty
decisions, even those involving foreigners. See Breard v. Greene, 118 S. Ct. 1352 (1998) (per
curiam); International Court of Justice, Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 37 I.L.M. 810 (Interim Protection Order of Apr. 9, 1998).
114. 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
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contexts, for example, in evaluating prison conditions: They have been
invoked in cases alleging that conditions of detention constitute cruel and
unusual punishment. The courts will look to conventions that the United
States has signed, whether or not they are self-executing, at least to assist in
the definition of acceptable standards. However, in the final analysis, courts
appear particularly reluctant to order changes to U.S. government policy, or
even to criticize it very aggressively, based on developments in international
law.
This is understandable when considered in its domestic, political context.
Senator Dole ran for President two years ago, campaigning against the GATT
as an erosion of U.S. sovereignty. It is hardly surprising that U.S. courts
would say that they "do not want our laws made by foreigners." A cynical,
negative conclusion would suggest that this is a familiar pattern: The United
States is the great champion of international law in the world, so long as it is
winning, but the moment it stands to have its conduct condemned, it changes
the rules. 20 As the world's only superpower, the United States is probably
uniquely situated to do that.
All in all, this cynicism is not merited. It is surely true that the United
States, and its judiciary in particular, can be a beacon of hope for those whose
rights are abused abroad, when the abusers seek to enjoy the benefits thattheir
presence, or their business, in this country can bring. But certainly one has to
temper one's optimism about the future of international human rights law in
the courts, of the United States until judges and political leaders accept the
notion that, in the international legal order, the United States is subject to the
laws and cannot make, repeal, or ignore elements of that body of law on its
own initiative or for its own domestic or political reasons.
To become a worthy subject of international law was an important
objective of the founders of this country. To remain so, and not to claim to
be above the law, is a goal to which the American public, their heirs, might
usefully dedicate themselves.
120. An obvious illustration of this point is the purported withdrawal of the United States
from the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in a futile effort to avoid
losing the judgment in the Nicaragua case.
